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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Board of Review act in an arbitrary and capri-

cious fashion in failing to consider the employeefs continued
negligence,

repeated

accumulated

errors,

and

numerous

acts

of

failure to properly perform his work as being disqualifying conduct
sufficient to constitute willful or wanton conduct adverse to the
employer's rightful interest under U.C.A. §35-4-5(b)(1)?

[See

Martin v. Dept. of Employment S e c , 682 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1984).]
2.

Did the Board of Review commit reversible error in

failing to consider the continued inefficiency, repeated carelessness, lack of care and accumulated
sufficient to constitute "just cause"?

errors of the employee as
[See Department of Employ-

ment Security Rules and Regulations, Section A71-07-1:5(A)(5).]
3.

Has

the

Department

of

Employment

Security

properly

defined "just cause" in its determination of the nature of the acts
of the respondent employee?
4.

Was the appellant denied due process when the Board of

Review failed to provide it with a copy of repondent Dailami's
brief, which failure appellant could only discover after reviewing a
copy of the appeal record?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The employee-respondent, Abdul Dailami, was discharged as a
boiler operator at Logan Hospital for just cause on January 30,
1985.

The employee was initially denied unemployment compensation

benefits pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(1), in a
decision from the Department of Employment Security dated February
20, 1985, for the reason he was terminated for just cause (Record
pg. 0176).

He appealed the initial decision of this Department on

February 25, 1985.
Administrative

Subsequently, a hearing was held before an

Law Judge on March 20, 1985, who reversed the

decision of the Department, holding that the employee was not
discharged

for just cause and awarding the claimant unemployment

compensation benefits (Record pp. 0120 - 0121).

This decision was

upheld by the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah
in its decision dated May 10, 1985 (Record pp. 008 - 0010).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are well-established in the record consisting in
part of the transcript of the hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge

(Record

(hereinafter

Rec.) pp. 0122 - 0140), the exhibits

received on the date of the hearing before the ALJ, including the
two written reprimands given Mr. Dailami prior to his termination
(Rec.

0146 and 0157 - 0164), both of which were received by Mr.

Dailami

(Rec. 0087, 0089 and 0146), and the affidavits of Mr.

Dailami's supervisor, Dennis Ostermiller, and two witnesses (Rec.
0084 - 0090) .
As noted by the ALJ in his opinion, the final episode after
at least

three other

incidents and

actions and a reprimand"

"two disciplinary

counseling

(Rec. 0120) (there were actually two
-2-

reprimands - see Rec. 0146 and 0157 - 0164) which finally resulted
in the employee's dismissal was the unscheduled repair of a leaking
valve which involved the shutdown of the entire water system for
Logan Hospital

(Rec. 0120 and 0126).

Because of the employee's

failure to assure that the by-pass valve was properly monitored, the
water supply for the hospital was interrupted (Rec. 0126).
As evidenced by the testimony of the employee's supervisor,
Mr. Dennis Ostermiller, at the hearing (Rec. 0125 - 0131) as well as
two written reprimands for previous equipment shutdowns and other
instances of failure to perform duties, dated September 2f 1983
(Rec. 0146), and September 11, 1984 (Rec. 0157 - 0164), the cut-off
of the hospital's water supply on January 14, 1985, was merely the
culminating event in a history of similar incidents of negligence,
poor work performance, failure of the employee to perform assigned
duties, and violations of hospital policies (see Rec. 0125 - 0131).
The

repeated

incidents are well-documented

in the written

reprimands as well as the oral references by Mr. Ostermiller.
In addition to the January 14, 1985, incident, those situations involving the interruption of critical services to the
hospital are as follows:
1.

On July 29, 1983, the employee shut off the two cooling

towers (Rec. 0146, 0085).
2.

The employee-respondent, on September 1, 1983, again shut

down the two cooling towers for the hospital (Rec. 0146, 0085).

-3-

3.

In the winter of 1983, without prior notification, the

employee turned off the boiler, resulting in total loss of steam for
the building (Rec. 0146, 0085).
4.

On at least two instances on unspecified dates there was

a total loss of hot water at the hospital due to employee's inability to repair water heaters (Rec. 0085, 0161).
5.

During a repair in 1983, the employee failed to put the

medical air compressor on by-pass with the result that there was a
loss of respiratory air in the hospital.

This could have resulted

in the death of a patient had anyone been on a respirator at the
time (Rec. 0085, 0161 - 0162).
In addition, the employee failed to perform or complete the
following maintenance or repairs as instructed:
1.

Mr. Dailami failed to replace the steam trap in the

pharmacy and failed to replace a steam valve in the engineering
shop (Rec. 0086, 0157 - 0158).
2.

Despite repeated requests, Mr. Dailami failed to repair

the number one chilled water circulating pump (Rec. 0086, 0158).
3.

The employee failed to replace or repair pop-off valves

(Rec. 0086, 0158).
4.

The employee took almost two years (August 1982 - July

1984) to repair the number one water heater for the hospital (Rec.
0086, 0158).
5.

It took the employee from the spring of 1984 to June of

1984 to repair a boiler problem (Rec. 0158).
-4-

6.

After the employee's departure, it was discovered that he

had failed to properly maintain anti-corrosive chemical levels in
the hospital boiler and steam system, resulting in excessive corrosion.

He was admonished about this while still at the hospital

(Rec. 0086, 0160).
Finally, Mr. Dailami showed an inability to diagnose or
repair equipment in the following instances:
1.

Failure

through

June

1984

to

diagnose

a

de-aerator

temperature control problem (Rec. 0087, 0159).
2.

Failure to diagnose a proof of closure switch problem on

boilers in 1983 as well as 1984 (Rec. 0159, 0160).
3.

Failure to diagnose heat control problems on number one

and number two water heaters in 1983 and 1984 (Rec. 0158, 0159).
4.

Failure to diagnose a medical air compressor unloader

valve malfunction (Rec. 0087, 0160).
5.

Failure

in

early

1984

to

diagnose

a

pneumatic

air

compressor bearing problem (Rec. 0087, 0160).
6.

Failure to properly repair number 2 heat pump (Rec.

7.

Failure in the summer of 1983 to repair an autoclave as

0160) .

requested (Rec. 0187).
Evidence of all the above-stated facts were presented to the
ALJ

in either oral testimony or in written exhibits and were

available to the Board of Review.
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Nevertheless, the ALJ as well as

the Board of Review ignored reference to these accumulated, repeated
and numerous failings and errors of the employee-respondent, characterizing them as "isolated incidents" (Rec. 0009, 0121).
Finally, in an act discovered only after this appeal was
filed and the record examined, it was learned that although a copy
of appellant's brief was sent by the Department of Employment
Security to the employee-respondent (Rec. 0082), the Department did
not provide the appellant, Logan Hospital, with a copy of the
materials which were the equivalent of respondent's brief that Mr.
Dailami filed with the Department of Employment Security (Rec. 0016
- 0081) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judging from the decision of the Board of Review and the ALJ,
it appears that their interpretation of "just cause" is that unless
an employee performs a "willful or wanton act," the employer must
accept sloppy, negligent, substandard performance and continue to
employ error-prone persons, and discharge will require the employer
to pay unemployment compensation benefits.

The appellant maintains

"just cause" for discharging an employee can and should be the
employee's inability to meet the standards and procedures of the
employer which are known to the employee.

Furthermore, the appel-

lant maintains that violations, mistakes, and accidents can accumulate, as they did in the case of Mr. Dailami, until the totality of
the repeated nature of the conduct constitutes either willful or
-6-

wanton conduct as specified in Martin v. Dept. of Employment S e c ,
682 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1984), or "just cause" for discharge, rendering
the employee ineligible for unemployment compensation.

The proposed

Rules and Regulations of the Industrial Commission, §A71-07-l:
5(A)(5), specifically provide that "continued inefficiency, repeated
carelessness, or lack of care exercised

by ordinary, reasonable

workers in similar circumstances," may be disqualifying as far as
unemployment

compensation

is

concerned.

Notwithstanding

this

language, this aspect of "just cause" was totally ignored by the
Board of Review.
The Administrative Law Judge in hearing the respondent's case
admitted that there had been prior occasions involving equipment
shutdowns

(Rec. 0120).

In the findings of fact the ALJ also

determined there had been prior reprimands, although there was no
reference to other conduct adverse to the interest of employer, but
reference only to the prior equipment shutdowns (Rec. 0120).
withstanding

these

factors

and

the

fact

that

the

Utah

NotState

Legislature in 1983 amended the Utah Code in Utah Code Annotated
§35-4-5(b)(1)

to

add

another

reason

separate

and

apart

from

"deliberate, willful or wanton conduct adverse to the employer's
rightful

interest,"

to-wit

"just

cause",

the

ALJ

ignored

the

continued and repeated nature of the employee's conduct as sufficient to constitute either

"willful or wanton conduct" or "just

cause" and denied and reversed the Department's initial decision
that the employee had been fired for just cause.
-7-

The Board of Review also failed or refused to consider the
continued, repeated and accumulated nature of respondent's errors,
referring

to them as "isolated

instances"

(Rec. 0009), not con-

sidering the fact that in Martin v. Dept. of Employment S e c , supra,
this Court admitted that "repeated acts of negligence" could rise to
the level of "deliberate, willful or wanton" conduct or that
continued inefficiency, repeated carelessness or lack of due care is
sufficient to constitute "just cause" under U.C.A. §35-4-5(b)(1) and
the Rules and Regulations of the Department of Employment Security,
Section A71-07-1:5(A)(5).
The Board of Review in its decision ignored the 18 incidents
of negligence, inefficiency or the employee's failure to perform his
duties referred to in the record and mentioned only four instances
of the respondent's failure to perform his responsibilities.

These

numerous incidents were characterized as "isolated instances," and
it was claimed that most of these incidents occurred in 1983.

The

Board of Review apparently felt that the standard should be that the
employer is under a legal obligation to blot from its memory earlier
infractions
termination.

and

reprimands

for

which

there

was

not

immediate

This position clearly runs contrary to the stance

taken by at least one other "just cause" jurisdiction.
The appellant maintains that the Board of Review clearly
misapplied

existing

standards

justifying

-8-

termination

and

the

withholding of unemployment benefits for the reason of willfull or
wanton conduct.
was

arbitrary

In light of this misapplication, the result reached
and

capricious,

immasculating

defined

terms

and

legislative intent.
In addition, "just cause" has not been properly defined or
applied by the Department of Employment Security.

This term was

improperly defined in the instant case in terms of the deliberate,
willful and wanton conduct.
Finally, the appellant to its prejudice was denied due
process when

the Department of Employment Security supplied the

respondent-employee with a copy of the appellant's brief on appeal
to the Board of Review while at the same time failing to provide
appellant with a copy of respondent's brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE BOARD OF REVIEW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE REPEATED, RECURRING AND NUMEROUS ACTS OF THE EMPLOYEE
WHICH WERE SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE WILLFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT
ADVERSE TO THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHTFUL INTEREST UNDER THE LANGUAGE OF
THIS COURT IN MARTIN V. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
682 P.2d 308 (1984) .
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Martin v. Department
of Employment Security, 682 P.2d

304, 305 (Ut. 1984), stated as

follows with regard to repeated acts sufficient to disqualify an
employee from receiving unemployment compensation benefits:
We concede that repeated negligence or carelessness by an employee who is totally indifferent or hostile to his employer's interests
-9-

might rise to the level of "deliberate, willful or wanton" conduct. (emphasis added)
In the Martin case, this Court cited two decisions which
stand for the above-cited proposition.

The first was Rieder v.

Commonwealth Employment Compensation Board of Review, 15 Pa. Commw.
211, 325 A.2d 347 (1974).

In that decision the claimant worked for

two years inspecting trousers for defects.

On a number of occasions

the employee passed trousers with obvious defects.

The Pennsylvania

court sustained that state's Department of Employment Security and
its Board of Review in its conclusion that the claimant was guilty
of "willful misconduct".

The conclusion was based on the fact that

the claimant could not explain her continued oversights, and her
supervisor

testified

that she did not believe that the employee

cared.
The second case cited by this Court was Collison v. Commonwealth Employment Compensation Board of Review, 66 Pa. Commw. 416,
444 A.2d 1330 (1982).

In that case, despite repeated warnings, the

claimant did not try to improve his working behavior.

The Penn-

sylvania

that

the

to

his

claimant's

court

upheld

conduct

the

Review

evidenced

a

Board's

conscious

conclusion
indifference

employer's interests and his employment duties, and that this was
enough to support a finding of "willful misconduct".
In addition to these cases, the appellant has discovered
other authorities which support this general proposition.

-10-

76 Am Jur

2d, Unemployment Compensation §54, page 948 states in pertinent part
as follows:
Work-connected negligence or inefficiency
constitutes misconduct within the meaning of
an unemployment compensation statute precluding a discharged employee from unemployment
compensation benefits when the negligence or
inefficiency is of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful
intent, evil design, or intentional or substantial disregard for that employer's interests or of an employee's duties and obligations. (emphasis added)
See also Drake v. Unemploy. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 470 A.2d 1115
(Pa, Cmwlth. 1984), where willful misconduct was found when a cab
driver employee was involved in five accidents in two years.

In

Appeal of Miller, 453 A.2d 1269 (N.H. 1982), three reprimands were
given to the claimant for safety violations.

On the fourth inci-

dent, which consisted of jumping off a loading dock when he was told
not to, he was discharged.

The denial of benefits was upheld due to

"recurring carelessness or negligent acts sufficient to constitute
misconduct" .
As previously noted, the employee's misconduct is well-documented in the record.

It was repetitive, recurring over a period of

approximately two years.

Mr. Dailami received two written repri-

mands, one in 1983 and one in September of 1984, with no improvements noted (Rec. 0146, 0157 - 0164).

Yet, in spite of this obvious

fact, the Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review, in words
that cause one to wonder if the record was read, described Mr.

-11-

Dailami's repeated acts of unacceptable conduct as ordinary negligence in "isolated instances" (Rec. 0009 - 0121).
Appellant maintains that the position of this Court regarding
repeated acts of negligence as being sufficient to constitute
"deliberate, willful and wanton conduct" should apply here, although
many of respondent's acts go beyond mere negligence.

If the conduct

of this employee in this case is not sufficiently repetitive or
recurring

to

constitute

willful

and

wanton

conduct

under

the

criteria set out in Martin v. Department of Employment Security,
supra, then one is caused to wonder if such a case exists.

Even if

the appellant were to concede that all of the respondent's failures
to properly perform were due to negligence, they can hardly be
termed "isolated."

While the incidents did occur one-at-a-time and

in this sense they were isolated, the incidents occurred again and
again and were so numerous as to cause any person of ordinary
intelligence to have reason to believe that if after two years there
was no improvement, that it was unlikely there would be any improvement in the future.

The fact that each incident happened one after

the other and that there may have been a time gap between the
happenings should not mean that the incidents were not repeated.
Surely, the appellant was not required to blot from its memory each
incident after it occurred.

To do so would mean that nothing would

ever rise to the repetitive standard required to constitute willful
or wanton conduct.

Furthermore, that appellant had not forgotten is

-12-

verified by the reprimands given to repondent referring to prior
acts •
Appellant will not replicate here the litany of equipment
failures,

failure

to

repair

equipment

and

other

incidents

of

improper work performance and job rule violations by the employeerespondent, but refers the Court to its summary contained in its
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Both the ALJ and the Board of Review apparently

ignored these numerous incidents, which were presented at the time
of the hearing, by summarily dismissing them almost without comment,
referring only to the equipment shutdowns.
The appellant maintains that in failing to apply the Martin
standard which in dicta stated that repeated acts of negligence or
carelessness can constitute deliberate, willful and wanton conduct,
the Board of Review entered findings not supported by substantial
evidence amounting to reversible arbitrary and capricious action.
See Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department of Employment Security,
657 P.2d 1312 (Ut. 1982) .
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND
AMOUNTED TO AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THAT THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY
SHOWED THAT THE EMPLOYEE WAS TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE ONLY AFTER
REPEATED WARNINGS FOR NUMEROUS ERRORS AND INCIDENTS OF FAILURE TO
PROPERLY PERFORM HIS WORK.
Assuming, for purposes of argument only, that the proposed
regulations defining "just cause", Section A71-07-1:5(II)-l of the
Rules and Regulations on Discharge, are correct, the employer

-13-

clearly met its burden of showing the required elements of culpability, knowledge and control, and there is not substantial evidence
to support the findings of the Board of Review, rendering its
decision reversible for the reason it is arbitrary and capricious.
An analysis of the elements of "just cause" as defined in the
proposed rules and regulations shows that the claimant's conduct
falls within each one of these elements:
A.

Culpability.

(§A71-07-l:5(A)(3)(a))

Culpability is defined in part as:
. . The wrongness of the conduct must be
considered in the context of the particular
employment and how it effects the employer's
rights.
If the conduct was an isolated
incident of poor judgment and there is no
expectation that the conduct will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be
shown and therefore it is not necessary to
discharge the employee. (emphasis added)
In the instant case, the conduct of the employee was not isolated,
but repetitive and persistent.

Indeed, some 18 separate and

distinct instances of conduct adverse to the interests of the
employer are noted in the record.
addition,

some

of

these

(See STATEMENT OF FACTS.)

incidents

potentially

involved

threatening situations to patients at the hospital.

In

life-

The claimant

was warned about shutdowns, maintenance failures, and failure to
perform duties, yet his performance continued to be deficient in
these areas, despite reprimands.

Significantly, both the Board of

Review and the ALJ characterized respondent's conduct as "isolated

-14-

instances," rather than an isolated instance
(See Addendum Exhibits H & I.)
together

comprise

repeated

"Isolated

instances.

(Rec. 0009, 0121).

instances" when added

Furthermore, the precise

reason reprimands were given was because there was reason to believe
based on experience that they would occur again, which, in fact,
proved to be the case.
The Board of Review further obfuscated the issue of culpability by referring to the culpability standard in Clearfield City
v. Board of Review, 663 P.2d 440 (Ut. 1983) (Rec. 0009), which was a
"willful and wanton" case, not a "just cause" termination case.
Culpability, as the rules and regulations require of employees for a
just cause termination disqualifying him for unemployment compensation, was clearly shown in the evidence because of the repetitive
nature of Mr. Dailami's misconduct.
B.

Knowledge.

(§A71-07-1:5(A)(3)(b))

Knowledge is defined in pertinent part as follows:
. . [H]e (the employee) should reasonably
have been able to anticipate the effect his
conduct would have. Knowledge may not be
established unless the employer gave a clear
explanation of the expected behavior or had a
written policy, except in the case of flagrant violation of a universal standard of
behavior. . . .
A specific warning is one
way of showing that the employee had knowledge of the expected conduct.
After the
employee is given a warning, he should be
given an opportunity to correct objectionable
conduct.
Additional violations occurring
after the warning would be necessary to
establish just cause for a discharge.
In both September of 1983 and September of 1984, the plaintiff was given warnings regarding unscheduled shutdown of equipment
-15-

and failure to perform maintenance.

Despite these warnings, the

conduct for which he was reprimanded continued, resulting in his
termination.

Surely, in light of the written reprimands, it cannot

be said that Mr. Dailami did not have knowledge of his deficiencies.
He signed the 1983 reprimand (Rec. 0146), and there are affidavits
of both persons who were present on the occasion of his second
reprimand in late 1984, who under oath both say that he received the
second reprimand (Rec. 0087 and 0089).
C.

Control.

(SA71-07-1:5(A)(3)(c))

With regard to control, the Rules and Regulations state:
The conduct must have been within the
power and capacity of the claimant to control
or prevent.
Significantly, the Board of Review conceded that "the incidents in
1983 may have been within claimant's control" (Rec. 0009).
the reprimands

indicate

Clearly,

the situation was within the employee's

power to control and prevent.
For reasons not entirely clear, the Rules and Regulations in
defining "just cause", Section A71-07-1:5(A)(4), state:
The term "just cause" as used in Section
5(b)(1) does not lessen the requirement that
there be some fault on the part of the
employee involved. Prior to the 1983 addition of the term "just cause" the commission
interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to require an
intentional infliction of harm or intentional
disregard of the employer's interests.
The intent of the Legislature in adding the
words "just cause" to Section 5(b)(1) was
apparently to correct this restrictive inter-16-

pretation. While some fault must be present,
it is sufficient that the acts were intended,
the consequences were reasonably foreseeable,
and that the acts have serious effect on the
employee's job or the employer's interests.
(emphasis added)
The aforementioned Rules and Regulations propose that mere
"mistakes, inefficiency, failures of performance as the result of
inability or incapacity, inadvertence in isolated instances, good
faith errors in judgment or in the exercise of discretion, minor but
casual or unintentional carelessness or negligence" are not sufficient to establish knowledge or control.

See §A71-07-l:5(A)(5)•

However, this same section, §A71-07-l:5(A)(5), seems to contradict
itself when it states as follows:
However, continued
inefficiency, repeated
carelessness, or lack of care, exercised by
ordinary reasonable workers in similar circumstances, may be disqualifying depending on
the reason and degree of the carelessness,
the knowledge and control of the employee.
(emphasis added)
The employee in this case was guilty of repeated instances of
carelessness and failure to perform as set out in detail in the
record.
received.

He certainly had knowledge because of the reprimands he
The absence of control seems to be characteristic of

negligence or carelessness and the requirement that the repeated
negligence or carelessness be within the control of the employee
seems contradictory.

Furthermore, in setting a lower standard for

"just cause" and abolishing the intentional aspect of it in Section
A71-07-1:5(A)(4),

imposing

a

control

requirement

seems

to

be

contradictory.

Neverthelessf the detailed reprimands and the very

nature of the work clearly demonstrate that the conduct was within
the employee's ability to prevent, thereby justifying the denial of
unemployment security benefits under U.C.A. §35-4-5(b)(1) for a just
cause termination.

Therefore, although under normal circumstances

in the event of an isolated occurrence fault would not be found, in
this case the conduct of the employee due to its repetitive nature
constituted "just cause" for termination.
The employee by his failure to follow instructions was guilty
of a "serious behavior problem" as set out in the Constructive
Discipline section of the hospital Employee Relations Policy (Rec.
0153).

Furthermore, item (5) on page 7 of the hospital Constructive

Discipline Policy (Rec. 0153) states as follows:
(5) inefficiency, incompetence, or negligence in the performance of duties (incompetence related to "patient care" is considered
very serious!) .
In addition, under the hospital Constructive Discipline Policy, page
8, item (6) (Rec. 0154), we read:
Examples of serious behavior problems or rule
violations can include but are not limited to
. . .

(6) refusal to carry out work instructions. . . .
By failing to complete the following duties the claimant was
remiss in executing his job as described in his "position description" :

(1) failure to repair steam trap in pharmacy,
(2) failure to replace steam valve in engineering shop, (3) failure to investigate improperly maintained pop-off valves on steam
system, (4) failure to repair number 1 water
circulating pump as requested, (5) failure to
properly monitor chemical mixture of water in
boiler and steam system.
(See employee's job description consisting of three pages and
attached in the Addendum as Exhibit A.

This job description was

submitted at the time of the hearing and appears in the Record at
pages 0141 - 0143.)
Finally, the State of Ohio has a statute which like Utah's
disqualifies employees from receiving unemployment benefits for just
cause.

(See Ohio Revised Code Annotated §4141.29(D)(2)(a) in

Addendum Exhibit B.)

Courts in Ohio considered some situations very

similar to the instant case and held that the employee was terminated for "just cause" and thereby disqualified

from receiving

unemployment compensation.
Probably the case which is most closely on point is Winters
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Review, et al., 9 CCH Unemployment Insurance Reporter, para. 9464, Ohio Court of Common Pleas,
Montgomery County, No. 81-3363, 12/29/82.

(See Addendum Exhibit C.)

In this case it was held that violations, mistakes and poor work
attitude can accumulate until the totality constitutes "just cause"
justifying discharge and disqualifying the employee for unemployment
compensation benefits.

Significant is the following language which

appears in that one page decision:

It is certain from the transcript that Donna
K. Woods knew the rules of the bank and was
warned of consequences of future infraction.
There were future infractions.
Further,
there is no legal requirement that an
employer somehow block from his memory the
infractions for which there was not an
immediate termination.
From the Referee's
decision, it appears that he is of the
opinion that unless an employee performs a
willful or a wrongful act, the employer must
accept sloppy work and continue employing the
error-prone person.
But just cause for
discharging an employee can be and should be
the employee's inability to meet the standards and procedures of the employer which
are made known to the employee. Violations,
mistakes and poor work attitude can accumulate until the totality constitutes "just
cause for discharge." (emphasis added)
A similar result was reached in the case of Nurse v. Board of
Review and Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Inc., 9 CCH Unemployment
Insurance Reporter, para. 9346, Ohio Court of Appeals, Summit
County. No. 9836, 2/18/81, (see Addendum Exhibit D) where for an
accumulation of errors an employee was fired for just cause, even
though she did not receive notice that future infractions would
subject her entire work record for review in consideration of
termination.

Similarly, in the case of Willie L. Steigle v. Board

of Review and Earl M. Jorgensen Co., Allen United Steel Division, et
al., 9 CCH Unemployment Insurance Reporter, para. 9449, Ohio Court
of Common Pleas, Ohio County, No. A-8009521, 2/9/82, an employee's
discharge for just cause was upheld for carelessness and negligent
work involving numerous errors by the employee.
Exhibit E.)

(See Addendum

In Martin v. Bd. of Reviewf supra, this Court said under
certain circumstances it would be willing to deem repeated acts of
negligence sufficient to constitute willful and wanton conduct.

A

similar, but lower, standard should apply to "just cause", and the
accumulation of errors and poor quality of work should be disqualifying.

The conduct as evidenced

in the instant case should

constitute termination for just cause requiring the denial of
unemployment compensation benefits.
It seems logical to apply the standard from Ohio where
conduct does not need to arise to the stature of misconduct and
where repeated acts of carelessness or negligence not amounting to
willful or wanton conduct are sufficient to constitute just cause.
POINT III
THE PROPOSED REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
A71-07-l:5(II)-l-DISCHARGE, MISDEFINES "JUST CAUSE."
U.C.A.

§35-4-5(b)(1)

states

as

follows

with

employees1 ineligibility for unemployment compensation:
An individual is ineligible for benefits or
for purposes of establishing a waiting
period:
* * *

(b)(1) For the week in which the claimant
was discharged for just cause or for an act
or omission in connection with employment,
not constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the
employer's rightful interest, if so found by
the commission, and thereafter until the
claimant has earned an amount equal to at
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit
amount in bona fide covered employment,
(emphasis added)

regard

to

The proposed rules and regulations defining "just cause"
promulgated by the Department of Employment Security contained in
Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(3) state in part as follows:
The basic factors which establish fault and
are essential for a determination of ineligibility under the definition of just cause
are:
a. Culpability. This is the seriousness
of the conduct as it affects continuance of
the employment relationship. The discharge
must have been necessary to avoid actual or
potential harm to the employer's rightful
interests. A discharge would not be considered "necessary" if it is not consistent
with reasonable employment practices.
The
wrongness of the conduct must be considered
in the context of the particular employment
and how it effects the employer's rights. If
the conduct was an isolated incident of poor
judgment and there is no expectation that the
conduct will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown and therefore it
is not necessary to discharge the employee.
b. Knowledge. The employee must have had
a knowledge of the conduct which the employer
expected.
It is not necessary that the
claimant intended to cause harm to the
employer, but he should reasonably have been
able to anticipate the effect his conduct
would have. Knowledge may not be established
unless the employer gave a clear explanation
of the expected behavior or had a written
policy, except in the case of flagrant violations of a universal standard of behavior.
If the employer's expectations are unclear,
ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence of
knowledge is not shown. A specific warning
is one way of showing that the employee had
knowledge of the expected conduct. After the
employee is given a warning, he should be
given an opportunity to correct objectionable
conduct.
Additional violations occurring
after the warning would be necessary to
establish just cause for a discharge.

c. Control. The conduct must have been
within the power and capacity of the claimant
to control or prevent.
This language was approved by this Court in Kehl v. Board
of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Decision No. 20193,
filed May 23, 1985.
Appellant maintains the standard set out in the proposed rule
is so rigid that it seems doubtful that anything less than "the
deliberate, willful or wanton" standard also contained
§35-4-5 (b) (1) will suffice to meet it.

in U.C.A.

Indeed, it is hard to

imagine how the standards of culpability, knowledge and control can
be met without also meeting the willful and wanton standard.

Three

other jurisdictions, as noted in the Kehl decision, Ohio, Indiana
and Delaware, have also adopted "just cause" as disqualifying an
employee for unemployment security benefits.

[See Addendum Exhibit

B, Ohio Revised Code Annotated §4141.29(D)(2)(a); Exhibit F, West's
Annotated Indiana Code §22-4-15-1; and Exhibit G, Delaware Code 19
§3315(2).]

Furthermore, Indiana and Ohio courts have both held that

repeated negligence is sufficient to constitute fault.
In the Indiana case of Wakshlag v. Review Board of Indiana
Employment Security, 413 N.E. 2d 1078, 1082 (Ind. App. 1980), we
read:
"Fault" or " j u s t cause" as used in the
Employment S e c u r i t y A c t , means f a i l u r e or
v i o l a t i o n , and does not mean something blameworthy, c u l p a b l e , or worthy of c e n s u r e . . . .
Determination of j u s t cause i s a question of
fact.
( c i t a t i o n omitted)
I t i s conduct

evincing such willful or wanton disregard of
employer's interest as is found in deliberate
violations or disregard of standards of
behavior which the employer has the right to
expect of his employee, or a carelessness or
negligence of such a degree or recurrence as
to manifest equal culpability, wrongful
intent, evil design, or to show an intentional or substantial disregard of employer's
interests, or of employee's duties or obligations to his employer, (emphasis added)
Here, an Indiana appeals court said that "just cause," which it
equates with fault, does not mean culpable conduct, yet the Utah
Department of Employment Security has made culpability an element.
See Rules and Regulations Section A71-07-1:5( A) (3 ) ( a) .

It is also

significant, as previously noted, that one definition of just cause
in Indiana is framed in terms of willful or wanton conduct or
carelessness or negligence of a recurring nature.

This sounds more

like the repeated negligence standard of Martin v. Dept. of Employment Security, supra, than just cause.
In the case of Delaware, that state's Supreme Court defined
just cause in terms of a willful or wanton conduct.

As stated in

Starkey v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 340 A.2d 165, 166
(Del. Supr. Ct. 1975), this language was cited with approval in the
Delaware Supreme Court case of Employee Insurance Appeal Board v.
Martin, 413 A.2d 1265, 1267 (1981):
Generally, the term "just cause" refers to a
willful or wanton act in violation of either
the employers' interest, or of the employee's
duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct. (citations omitted) It is
essentially the equivalent of the term "misconduct" found in the Unemployment Compensa-

tion Statutes, and interpreted
law of the jursidictions.
Accordingly, Delaware definitions

should

in the case
not be looked

to since

"just cause" in that jurisdiction appears to be equated with willful
and wanton conduct.
jurisdiction

Caution needs to be exercised in our own

that just cause is not confused with the higher

standard of willful and wanton acts and that in Utah "just cause"
does not become equated with willful and wanton conduct,
Ohio courts have established a standard for just cause which,
while it requires fault, does not confuse willful and wanton conduct
or misconduct with the less eggregious "just cause".

As stated in

Sellers v. Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment, 440 N.E.2d
550, 552 (Ohio App. 1981):
. . .There is, of course, not a slide rule
definition of just cause. Essentially, each
case must be considered upon its particular
merits.
Traditionally, just cause, in the
statutory sense, is that which, to an ordinary intelligent person is a justifiable
reason for doing or not doing a particular
act...
This court had occasion to construe the
words "just cause" in relation to a resignation in Payton v. Sun TV (citation omitted).
We said there that just cause had no slide
rule definition; rather each case must be
considered
upon
its
particular merits.
Traditionally, just cause in the statutory
sense is that which, to an ordinary intelligent person is a justifiable reason for
doing or not doing a particular thing. . . .
As also stated in the case of Angelkovski v. Buckeye Potato
Chip Company, Inc., 463 N.E. 2d 1280, 1284 (Ohio App. 1983), in
construing just cause:
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We have previously held that "just cause" is
that kind of conduct which an ordinarily
intelligent person would regard as a justifiable reason for discharging an employee,
(citations omitted) The conduct need not
rise to the stature of misconduct/ but there
must be some fault on the part of the employee.
As previously noted in ARGUMENT/ POINT IIf a number of Ohio cases
have held that an accumulation of errors or continued poor quality
work is enough to constitute discharge for just cause.

This would

seem to say that a standard similar to that of Martin v. Dept. of
Employment Security/ 682 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1984), for repeated acts of
negligence/ but something less than willful or wanton conduct/
should be sufficient to constitute just cause.
Summary
Delaware seems to equate just cause with willful and wanton
conduct.

Both Indiana and Ohio courts have held that accumulated

errors or repeated negligent acts or carelessness are sufficient to
constitute

just

cause

and

render

unemployment security benefits.

an

employee

ineligible

for

In addition, both Indiana and Ohio

seem to reject knowledge and control as elements of just cause,
although Indiana equates just cause with willful and wanton conduct.
Ohio has adopted an "ordinary intelligent person" standard as
just cause for termination.

The appellant urges that this standard

also be adopted in this state as grounds for termination for just
cause.
The appellant submits that the proposed rules and regulations
defining

"just cause" are

in error and that by applying such
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stringent definitions, in the instant case, the Board of Review
committed reversible error in affirming the reversal of the denial
of

unemployment

compensation

by

the

Department

of

Employment

Security.
POINT IV
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DENIED THE APPELLANT DUE PROCESS WHEN IT FAILED
TO MAIL APPELLANT A COPY OF MR. DAILAMI'S BRIEF WHICH APPELLANT
DISCOVERED ONLY WHEN IT REVIEWED THE RECORD ON APPEAL.
The Utah Department of Employment Security has no rules and
regulations regarding the procedural aspects of filing briefs or
written memoranda

in matters appealed to the Board of Review.

However, in the Record at page 0114, correspondence from this
Department reveals that once the transcript of the hearing was
supplied, employer was allowed ten days from the date of the letter
to submit a written memorandum.

As indicated in the Record, page

0082, the respondent Mr. Dailami was provided with a copy of the
employer's brief and given ten days from the date of the letter to
submit a written response memorandum.

However, when Mr. Dailami did

submit a rather lengthy letter and attachments within the ten days
allowed by the Department of Employment Security (Rec. 0016 - 0081),
this response brief was not forwarded

to appellant's counsel as

appellant's brief had been forwarded to the respondent, Mr. Dailami.
This failure was discovered only after appeal was made to the
Supreme Court and after the appellant obtained a copy of the record
on appeal.

Appellant maintains that this was clearly a denial of
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procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah which deprived the respondent of
the right of filing a reply brief.
Because the Department of Employment Security has no rules
and regulations regarding procedure on appeal to the Board of
Review, the Department of Employment Security can hardly be faulted
for failure to apply its own rules and regulations.

However, the

appellant maintains that fundamental rights of due process have been
denied.
This Court in Nielsen v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Ut.
1983), stated as follows with regard to procedural due process
mandated

by

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

of

the

United

States

Constitution and Utah's Constitution, Article I, Section 7:
"Due process" is not a technical concept
that can be reduced to a formula with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.
Rather, "the demands of due
process rest on the concept of basic fairness
of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties
involved."
Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah,
610 P.2d 338, 341 (1980) .
The appellant maintains that it was not accorded procedural
due process when the employee was provided with a copy of the
employer's brief, but the employer was not provided with a copy of
the employee's brief, thereby depriving the appellant of making any
sort of comment or filing a reply brief at the administrative level.
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Although

the

appellant

realizes

that

in

administrative

procedure, the niceties of the technical rules of law are not as
strictly

supplied, nevertheless, fundamental

fairness within the

concept of procedural due process should be observed.

Indeed, this

Court's own rules provide for service of briefs on the opposing
parties.

(See Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.)

While the employee can certainly be excused from understanding this,
it does not seem that the Utah Department of Employment Security
should escape such criticism; especially, when that body took upon
itself to provide the employee a copy of appellant's brief to the
Board of Review when the appellant had already certified that he had
sent a copy of his brief to the employee, and then denied appellant
similar treatment.
As previously noted, the Rules and Regulations of the Department of Employment Security are silent on the issue of serving the
opposing party with a copy of that party's brief.
appellant

maintains

that

procedural

due

process

opposing parties be served with copies of briefs.

Nevertheless,
dictates

that

5 CJS Appeal and

Error, §1336(b), states as follows with regard to the failure of a
party to serve the opposing party with a copy of his brief:
The effect of a failure to serve a brief on
the adverse party to the appeal, or on his
counsel, varies in accordance with the statutory provisions and rules of the court in the
particular jurisdiction, and the effect of
such a failure also depends, to some extent,
at least, on the facts and circumstances of
the case. Thus, a failure properly to serve
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the brief may cause the appellate court to
refuse to consider the brief; counsel may be
subjected to a penalty, although it may not
be grounds for dismissal; it may be grounds
for dismissal, in the discretion of the
court, . . . (emphasis added)
It is not for the appellant to dictate what penalty should be
assessed

for

the Department of Employment

Security's

failure to

provide appellant with a copy of the brief of the employee at the
administrative level.

It should probably not be a dismissal of the

appeal at the administrative level.
Department
employee's

of

Employment

interests before

Security

However, inasmuch as the
generally

represents

the

the Board of Review, for failure to

provide appellant's counsel a copy of the employee's brief at the
administrative level the penalty, at the very least, should be that
those materials submitted by the employee should not be considered
as part of the record on appeal.

In any event, the appellant has

clearly been denied procedural due process at the administrative
level and deprived of the opportunity to submit a reply brief.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, appellant maintains that both the
Board of Review and the Administrative Law Judge erred in granting
the employee the benefit of unemployment

security payments.

In

addition, just cause has been misdefined by the Department of
Employment Security.

Finally, this appellant was denied procedural

due process at the administrative level.

The appellant, Logan

Regional Hospital, therefore requests that this Court reverse the
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decision of the Board of Review and enter an order denying unemployment compensation benefits to the employee, Abdul H. Dailami.
Dated this £7*y

day of September, 1985.

Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, M££ONKIE & BUSHNELL

By
Larry
Attorne
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for Appellant

ADDENDUM

Item
Logan Regional Hospital Boiler Operator Job
Description

. .Exhibit A

Page's Ohio Revised Code Annotated, §4141.29

Exhibit B

Winters National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bd. of Rev.,
et al. 9 CCH Unemployment Security Reporter,
para 9464, Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery
County No. 81-3363, 12/29/82

Exhibit C

Nurse v. Board of Review and Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., Inc. , 9 CCH Unemployment Security Reporter,
para. 9346, Ohio Court of Appeals, Summit County,
No. 9836, 2/18/81

Exhibit D

Willie L. Steagall v. Bd. of Rev, and Earle M.
Jorgensen Co., Allan United Steel Division, et al.,
9 CCH Unemployment Security Reporter, para. 9449,
Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County No.
A-8009521, 2/9/82

Exhibit E

West's Annotated Indiana Code, §22-4-15-1

Exhibit F

Decision of Administrative Law Judge, March 26, 1985

Exhibit G

Decision of Board of Review, June 18, 1985

Exhibit H
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POSITION DESCRIPTION (NON-EXEMPT)

'ION 1 1 1 1 £l

Be i lei 'Operator

DATE:

March, 1983

Wkll TEN ,h

•R OF INCUMBENTS:
tVISOR'!) TITLE!

Manager of Plant Operations

IIZATIONAL UNIT:

Plant Operations

2DDE:

APPROVED BY:

£d&&&&

CLzz^
PAY GRADE:

:C FUNCTION
XT general supervision, the boiler operator is accountable for performing corrective
preventive maintenance of all boilers and boiler related equipment and other building
>ort equipment located in the mechanical area.
JRE AND SCOPE
Knowledge
incumbent must be epxerienced m the appropriate operation of 350 HP or larger boilers.
Lcensed boiler operator is preferred. The incumbent must demonstrate knowledge of low and
i"pressure steam boilers, and understanding of boiler de-airators, chemical feed systems,
maintaining appropriate fluid levels. Must be familiar with the operation of large
5T chillers, compressors, vacuum pumps, and large three phase motor pumping systems. The
umbent must have knowledge and experience of water coolers,serpentine maintenance, and
am traps repair and maintenance, and in pumping systems, water theimodynamic cycles,
flow and air cleanliness.
erpersonal Skills
incumbent deals frequently on a face-to-face basis with hospital employees, department
agers, and employees within the immediate work group and must therefore possess quality
erpersonal relationship skills.
ipment Operated
• incumbent operates manual and electrical equipment related to boiler maintenance, includi
nches, pipe threaders, fittings, and pumps. The incumbent also operates manual and electr
. tools related to preventive maintenance or repair of the physical plant, including
.ders, grinders, voltage meters, spray guns, etc.
jiking Requirements/Decision Making
* incumbent is responsible for conducting routine tests on the boiler equipment and
:ermining that it is operating safely and efficiently. When problems in systems operation
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occur, the incumbent is responsible for determining the cause of breakdown and
restoring the system to proper operation. The incumbent attends department meetings
where the department manager provides safety instructions, discusses hospital
procedures, and any other necessary items. The department manager is available
for assistance when necessary. When additional equipment or more time is required
to complete an approved job, the incumbent obtains approval from the department
manager.
Rsults of Work:
All preventive and corrective maintenance to boilers and boiler related equipment,
including steam sterilizers, water pumps, cooling towers, and hot water tanks must
be completed in an efficient and timely manner to the satisfaction of the department
manager and to meet safety codes and insurance regulations. The incumbent must be
aware of the hazards of working with electrical equipment, hot water and steam.
Implications of error include damage to the building or equipment and injury to the
employee.
PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTABILITIES
1.

Responsible for the safe and appropriate operation of glycol systems, penthouse
• heating and cooling systems, and penthouse air handling systems.

2.

Performs routine checks on steam gauges, fuel levels, and other liquid levels.

3.

Maintains and repairs steam traps, de-airation equipment, vacuum pumps, compressors, and other special equipment.

4.

Responsible for the safe and appropriate operation of hospital dual 350 HP
boilers.

5.

Performs preventive maintenance on all equipment in assigned areas.

6.

Responsible for the appropriate operation of water softeners and water heaters.

'7.

Trouble shoots the boiler system, including filling the boiler, getting up
steam, and maintaining the water level.

8.

Analyzes problems in boiler operation and restores operation when common
problems occur.

9.

Performs all routine tests to boiler and other hot water and steam systems,
including assuring proper chemical balance in feed pumps, routine documentation
of boiler operating pressure, and routine temperature checks on hot water to*
the building.

10.

Performs inspections to the boiler and related components as required by law
or insurance carriers and maintains appropriate documentation of such.

11.

Maintains cleanliness of work areas and performs repairs on required or assigned
equipment.

12.

Responsible for maintenance and repair of deionized system.
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Page 3 of 3
13.

Responsible for maintenance and operation of the honeywell compressors.

14.

Ki

•• *

i ncinerator.

Working Conditions:
The incumbent works in a clean working environment except when working above the
ceiling or working with a serious steam or hot water leak. The incumbent frequently
lifts up to 100 pounds. Possible dangers on the job include electrical shock
and injury from hot water or steam. The incumbent is exposed to constant medium
level noise from the boilers and equipment in the mechanical area. The incumbent must
work safely with caustic chemicals.

OIJ;J

§ 4141.29

PAGE'S OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOTATED

grant a writ of mandamus requiring the board of review to
schedule a hearing on the question of whether the claimant
is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits: State
ex rel. Cox v. Lopeman, 13 OApp3d 192, 130 OBR 239,
468 NE2d 781.
25. (1984) The common pleas court, in an appeal from
an administrative agency, must give due deference to the
agency's resoluton of evidentiary conflicts and the court
may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. If,
at the agency level, a preponderance of reliable, probative
and substantial evidence exists, the common pleas court
must affirm the agency's decision: Budd Co. v. Mercer, 14
OApp3d 269, 14 OBR 298, 471 NE2d 151.
26. (1984) Under RC § 4141.28(0), it is proper for the
trial court to dismiss the appeal of an unemployment compensation claimant who failed to provide a copy of the
notice of appeal to the board of review, where, due to this
failure, the board was unable to provide the court with a
transcript of the record: Palic v. Garland Floor Co., 14
OApp3d 297, 14 OBR 354, 471 NE2d 164.
27. (1984) A court of common pleas may not substitute
its judgment for that of the unemployment compensation
board of review on factual issues, and may modify the
board's decision and enter final judgment only where the
facts are not in dispute and such undisputed facts are determinative of the issues. Where, however, the referee has no
conflicting testimony and evidence, the referee's decision
may be reversed if no substantial evidence supports it:
Wilson v. Bd. of Review, 14 OApp3d 309, 14 OBR 374,
471 NE2d 168.
28. (1984) In dealing with a claim that the judgment is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing
court can reverse only if the verdict is so manifesdy contrary to the natural and reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence as to produce a result in complete violation of substantial justice: Sambunjak v. Bd. of Review, 14
OApp3d 432, 14 OBR 550, 471 NE2d 835.
§ 4 1 4 1 . 2 9 Eligibility and qualification for
benefits.
Each eligible individual shall receive benefits as
compensation for loss of remuneration due to involuntary total or partial unemployment in the
amounts and subject to the conditions stipulated in
sections 4141.01 to 4141.46 of the Revised Code.
(A) No individual is entitled to a waiting period
or benefits for any week unless he:
(1) Has filed a valid application for determination of benefit rights in accordance with section
4141.28 of the Revised Code;
(2) Has made a claim for benefits In accordance
with section 4141.28 of the Revised Code;
(3) Has registered at an employment office or
other registration place maintained or designated by
the administrator of the bureau of employment services. Registration shall be made in person or in
writing in accordance with the time limits, frequency, and manner prescribed by the administrator.
(4) (a) Is able to work and available for suitable
work and is actively seeking suitable work either in
a locality in which he has earned wrages subject to
Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code, during his base
period, or if he leaves such locality, then in a locality
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where suitable work is normally performed.
The administrator may waive the requirement
that a claimant be actively seeking work when he
finds that an individual has been laid off and the
employer who laid him off has notified the administrator within ten days after the layoff, that
work is expected to be available for the individual
within a specified number of days not to exceed
forty-five calendar days following the last day the
individual worked. In the event the individual is not
recalled within the specified period, such waiver
shall cease to be operative with respect to such
layoff.
(b) The individual shall be instructed as to the efforts that he must make in his search for suitable
work, except where the active search for work requirement has been waived under division (A)(4)(a)
of this section, and shall keep a record of where and
when he has sought work in complying with such instructions and shall, upon request, produce such
record for examination by the administrator.
(c) An individual who is attending a training
course, approved by the Ohio worker training
committee or the administrator, meets the requirement of this division, if such attendance was recommended by the administrator and the individual is
regularly attending the course, and is making satisfactory progress. An individual also meets the requirements of this division if he is participating and
advancing in a training program, as defined in division (P)"of section 5709.61 of the Revised Code, and
if an enterprise defined in division (B) of section
5709.61 of the Revised Code is paying all or part of
the cost of the individual's participation in the training program with the intention of hiring the individual for employment as a new employee as defined
in division (L) of section 5709.61 of the Revised
Code for at least ninety days after the individual's
completion of the training program.
(d) An individual who becomes unemployed
while attending a regularly established school and
whose base period credit weeks were earned in
whole or in part while attending such school, meets
the availability and active search for work requirements of division (A)(4)(a) of this section if he
makes himself available on any shift of hours for
suitable employment with his most recent employer
or any other employer in his base period, or for any
other suitable employment to which he is directed,
under Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code.
(e) The administrator shall adopt such rules as he
deems necessary for the administration of division
(A)(4) of this section,
(f) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
section, no otherwise eligible individual shall be
denied benefits for any week because he or she is in
training approved under section 236 (a)(1) of the
"Trade Act of 1974," 88 Stat. 1978, 19 U.S.C. 2296,
nor shall such individual be denied benefits by
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reason of leaving work to enter such training, provided the work left is not suitable employment, or
because of the application to any week in training of
provisions in Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code, or
any applicable federal unemployment compensation law, relating to availability for work, active
search for work, or refusal to accept work.
For the purposes of division (A)(4)(f) of this section, "suitable employment" means with respect to
an individual, work of a substantially equal or
higher skill level than the individual's past adversely
affected emplovment, as defined for the purposes of
the "Trade Act of 1974," 88 Stat. 1978, 19 U.S.C.
2101, and wages for such work at not less than
eighty per cent of the individual's average weekly
wage as determined for the purposes of that federal
act.
(5) Is unable to obtain suitable work.
(B) An individual suffering total or partial
unemployment is eligible for benefits for unemployment occurring subsequent to a waiting period of
one week and no benefits shall be payable during
this required waiting period, but no more than one
week of waiting period shall be required of any such
individual in any benefit year in order to establish
his eligibility for total or partial unemployment
benefits except that, notwithstanding any other provisions of Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code, when
an individual qualifies within his benefit year for
three consecutive compensable weeks of total
unemployment occurring any.Jime after the required waiting period, he shall be patd benefits for
his waiting period claim in accordance with the
terms of Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code, except
that an individual who first files an application for
benefits during calendar years 1983, 1984, and 1985
shall not be paid benefits for his waiting week after
he qualifies within his benefit year for three consecutive compensable weeks of total unemployment.
(C) The waiting period for total or partial
unemployment shall commence on the first day of
the first week with respect to which the individual
first files a claim for benefits at an employment office or other place of registration maintained or
designated by the administrator or on the first day
of the first week with respect to which he has otherwise filed a claim for benefits in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the bureau of employment
services, provided such claim is allowed by the administrator or his deputy.
(Dffl&**W*te^^
®?rer»e?its under the following conditions:
(1) For any. week withrjespec^^wttfeff TSggbd-^ minis tratorfiTrds"that:
*:^a£ Bis- u**rapkjymeirt was due to a laoor dispute
otner than a lockout at any factory, establishment,
or etfaf§* pieiaisesiocated in this or any other state
and owned or operated by the employer by which

§4141.29

he is or was last employed; and for so long as his
unemployment is due to such labor dispute. No individual shall be disqualified under this provision if:
(i) His employment was with such employer at
any factory, establishment, or premises located in
this state, owned or operated by such employer,
other than the factory, establishment, or premises at
which the labor dispute exists, if it is shown that he
is not financing, participating in, or directly interested in such labor dispute; or
(ii) His employment was with an employer not involved in the labor dispute but whose place of
business was located within the same premises as the
employer engaged in the dispute, unless his
employer is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
employer engaged in the dispute, or unless he actively participates in or voluntarily stops work because
of such dispute. If it is established that the claimant
was laid off for an indefinite period and not recalled
to work prior to the dispute, or was separated by the
employer prior to the dispute for reasons other than
the labor dispute, or that he obtained a bona fide
job with another employer while the dispute was
still in progress, such labor dispute shall not render
the employee ineligible for benefits.
(b) He has been given a disciplinary layoff for
misconduct in connection with his work.
(2) For the duration of his* unemployment if the
administrator finds that:
(a) He quit his work without just cause qrr has
Been discharged for just cause in connection with his
work, provided division (D)(2) of this section does
not apply to the separation of a person under any of
the following circumstances:
(i) Separation from employment for the purpose
of entering the armed forces of the United States if
he makes application to enter, or is inducted into
such armed forces within thirty days after such
separation;
(ii) Separation from employment pursuant to a
labor-management contract or agreement, or pursuant to an established employer plan, program, or
policy, which permits the employee, because of lack
of work, to accept a separation from employment;
(iii) He has left his employment to accept a recall
from a prior employer or to accept other employment "as provided under section 4141.291 [4141.29.1] of the Revised Code, or has left employment
which is or was concurrent employment where the
remuneration, hours, or other conditions of such
employment are substantially less favorable than his
other work wrhich was performed during such concurrent employment and where such employment,
if offered as new work, would be considered not
suitable under the provisions of divisions (E) and (F)
of this section. Any benefits which would otherwise
be chargeable to the account of the employer from
whom an individual has left employment under
conditions described in division (D)(2)(a)(iii) of this
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of the judgment of the common pleas court
upon its jurisdiction.
Thus, the issue
raised by appellee's motion is the issue
presented by the merits of the appeal. A
motion to dismiss could be sustained under
such circumstances only if it be determined
that the appeal has no arguable merit.
In this case, however, not only does the
motion to dismiss raise an issue that can
be determined only by a review of the record on appeal, but appellant raises an issue
independent of the jurisdictional issue
raised by appellee by contending to the
effect that its complaint states a claim for
relief in declaratory judgment.
While this court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, which would
be applicable if the record on appeal reveals the facts to be as claimed by appellee,
this is one of the main issues raised by the

merits of the appeal itself. A motion to
dismiss is not the proper method for an
appellee to contest the merits of an appeal,
at least unless it be a frivolous appeal.
Here, however, the appellee has apparently confused the jurisdictional requisites
for the common pleas court with those for
this court, which are established by R. C.
2501.02, 2505.02, 2505.03 and 4141.26(B)
and Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio
Constitution. R. C. 4141.26(B) specifically
provides that the judgment of the common
pleas court may be appealed "as in ordinary civil cases."
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is
overruled.
Motion overruled.
REILLY and

MCCORMAC, JJ.,

[1f9464] Winters National Bank <fc Trust Co. v. Bd. of Rev., et al.
of Common Pleas, Montgomery County. No. 81-3363, 12/29/82.

concur.

Ohio Court

Discharge for misconduct—Manner of performing work—Accumulation of errors.—
Just cause for discharging an employee can be the employee's inability to meet the standards and procedures of the employer which are made known to the employee, and
violations, mistakes and poor work attitude can accumulate until the totality constitutes
"just cause for discharge." Accordingly, where a bank employee knew the rules of the
bank and was warned of the consequences of future infractions, but where future infractions occurred, this was just cause for her discharge. See Ohio fl 1970.52,
MACMILLAN, JR., J.: The Appellant-Em-

ployer filed its Notice of Appeal from the
decision of the Board of Review which
disallowed the application to institute a
further appeal. The decision of the Referee,
Joseph F. Weinle, dated September 23t
1981, is the subject of the Appellant's
appeal.
The Court, having reviewed the proceedings and the transcript of the testimony
before the Referee, finds that the Referee's
decision is unreasonable and against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
It is certain from the transcript (Pages
23-28) that Donna K. Woods knew the
rules of the bank and was warned of consequences of future infraction.
There
were future infractions. Further, there is
no legal requirement that an employer
somehow blot from its memory the infractions for which there was not an immediate
termination. From the Referee's decision,
it appears that he is of the opinion that
unless an employee performs a willful or
a wrongful act, the employer must accept
sloppy work and continue employing the

error-prone person. But just cause for
discharging an employee can be and should
be the employee's inability to meet the
standards and procedures of the employer
which are made known to the employee.
Violations, mistakes and poor work attitude can accumulate until the totality constitutes "just cause for discharge." In
this case, the conduct of Donna K. Woods
required termination of her employment
because the essence of confidence in banks
is dependent upon the exactness, the trustworthiness, and the attitude of the employee meeting the public.
The Administrator's decision was a reasonable one, not the Referee's decision.
The Court finds the Referee's decision
is unreasonable and against the manifest
weight of the evidence, that his decision
be overruled, and the decision of the Administrator be AFFIRMED.
This Order is intended as a final order
from which an appeal may be taken.
Copies of the above are hereby sent to
all parties listed below by ordinary mail
on this date of filing.

Ohio 11 9464

Unemployment Insurance Reports

EXHIBIT

r

Olhiio

Nfw

4141.28(0) and R. C 4141.01(1), in the
case at bar, we find that the lower court
erred in holding that it had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear Nurse's appeal.
Summary
We accordingly hold that the trial court
properly affirmed the Board of Review's
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decision and we overruled both of appellants assignments of error. Additionally,
upon the cross-assignment of error we
conclude the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Board's
decision. We, therefore, affirm the decision
of the court of common pleas.

[tT 9347] Herman W. Jones v. Glavic Motors, Inc., et al. Ohio Court of Appeals,
Lake County. No. 8-049, 3/2/81. Before DAHUNG, P. J., HOFSTETTER, J. and COOK, J.
Claims and appeals procedure—Taking and perfecting proceeding's for review—Notice
—Filing, sufficiency.—As the court was without jurisdiction to hear an appeal because
the appellant failed to serve the Administrator, the court was without authority to grant
leave to amend the appeal after the thirty-day time limit for appeal had expired. See
Ohio 1T 2020.72.
Claims and appeals procedure—Jurisdiction and powers of tribunal.—When the trial
court is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal on, its merits, it has no legal alternative
other than dismissal. See Ohio fl 2020.40.
Eugene M. Adelman, 28833 Euclid Ave., Wickliffe, Ohio 44092, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ronald Zele, 26111 Brush Ave., Euclid, Ohio 44132, and Q. Albert Corsi, Asst. Atty.
Gen., 810 The Lausche Bldg., 615 W. Superior Ave., Cleveland, Ohio 44113, for appellees.
Opinion
HOFSTETTER, P. J.: The Board of Review
of the Ohio Board of Employment services
determined that the appellant quit his em
ployment without just cause.
Appellant then filed a timely notice of
appeal to the Common Pleas Court, but
failed to serve notice on the Administrator
of the Bureau of Employment Services.
An amended notice of appeal, with leave
of court, was served on the Administrator
after the thirty-day time limit had expired.
The Attorney General filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, which was granted by
the Common Pleas Court The appellant
has appealed that dismissal, assigning three
errors, as follows:
1. Based on the express statutory language of Ohio Revised Code 4141.28(0)
and the facts of this case, it was error
for the court below to find that failure
to join the Administrator of the Ohio
Bureau of Employment Services as a
party-appellee was a jurisdictional de
feet
2. Since the court allowed the administrator to be joined as a party pursuant
to leave of court having been granted,
it was error for the court to dismiss
the appeal since joinder of the administrator did not rise to the level of a
jurisdictional defect but was procedural
only.
3. Based on the liberal construction
afforded to party appellants pursuant to
Unemployment Insurance Reports

the Ohio Revised Code section 4141.46
and remedial laws in general, it was error
for the court below to dismiss the within
appeal without hearing the case on its
merits.
This court has addressed the issue raised
herein at least twice during the past eighteen months, as noted in the appellees'
briefs. We held that failure to serve the
Administrator or any other interested party
to such appeal is a failure to perfect the
appeal, and the Common Pleas Court acquires no jurisdiction of said appeal. Our
thinking in that regard has been confirmed
by the Supreme Court in In re Claim of
King (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 87. That
court, in a unanimous per curiam opinion,
said in part:
In order to perfect an appeal under
R. C. 4141.28(0), the statute explicitly
requires that the party appealing serve
all other interested parties with notice.
Appellee herein failed to follow this directive when he failed to serve notice
on appellant Therefore, this court finds
that the Court of Common Pleas lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction in this matter.
• * *.

Appellee's reliance on our decision in
Joy Mfg. Co. v. Albaugh (1953), 159 Ohio
S t 460, is misplaced. In that case we
interpreted the predecessor statute to
the current R. C. 4141.28(0). The
earlier statute did not so clearly mandate
that the administrator of the Bureau of
Employment Services be served with
notice, as does the present statute.
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(Tr. 28) Q. And you're saying you
spilled about 300 gallons?
A. Approximately.
Q. Did you report this to anyone?
A. I didn't get to talk to the dispatcher that morning, but I told him that
evening when I come in.
Q. And that was when he fired you
though, right?
A. Right
The decision of the referee found that
Claimant was discharged for just cause in
connection with work, and mat the disqualification for benefits was properly imposed by the administrator, which decision
of the administrator., upon being reconsidered by the referee, was affirmed.
Application to institute further appeal
was disallowed by the Board of Review,
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Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Services.
The Common Pleas Court rendered judgment finding the decision of the Board
of Review not to be unlawful, unreasonable,
or against the manifest weight of the evidence.
On appeal to this Court, Claimant-Appellant has not set forth any separately
specified Assignments of Error in compliance with Rule 16(A)(2), Ohio Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
W e do not find the judgment of
Common Pleas Court appealed from
be either against the manifest weight
the evidence or contrary to law, and
error prejudicial to Appellant appearing,
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

the
to
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no
the

Judgment affirmed.

[1J9346] Stephanie E. Nurse v. Bd\ of Rev* and Firestone Tire & Rubber Company,
Inc. Ohio Court of Appeals, Summit County. N a 9836, 2/18/81.
Discharge for misconduct—Manner of performing work—Accumulation of errors.—A
claimant was discharged for just cause where she was discharged due to sleeping on the
job, tardiness, absenteeism, fighting, negligence and "poor work," notwithstanding her
contention that it was error as a matter of law to find just cause where she did not receive
notice that future infractions would subject her entire work record to review for consideration of termination. See Ohio fl 1970.52.
Claims and appeals procedure—Taking and perfecting proceedings for review—Notice
—Filing, sufficiency.—The court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal
where the appellant failed to name the Administrator as an appellee in the suit and to
serve him with a copy of the notice of appeal. See Ohio tf 2020.72.
Claims and appeals procedure—Jurisdiction and powers of tribunal.—The issue of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the lower court proceeding or
the appeal. See Ohio fl 2020.40.
Decision and Journal Entry
This cause was heard January 7, 1981,
upon the record in the trial court, and the
briefs. It was argued by counsel for the
parties and submitted to the court. W e
have reviewed each assignment of error and
make the following disposition:
MAHONEY, J.: The lower court denied the
attorney general's and Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company's, defendants-appellees,
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, but affirmed the Board of Review of Employment Services' decision that
Stephanie Nurse, plaintiff-appellant, was discharged for just cause. We affirm the decision of the lower court, and also hold that
the lower court erred in finding that it had
subject matter jurisdiction.
Facts
The Board of Review of Employment
Services held on November 6, 1979, that
Unemployment Insurance Reports

Stephanie Nurse was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits because
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (hereafter Firestone) discharged her for just
cause. Nurse appealed the Board's decision
to the court of common pleas.
In Nurse's notice of appeal filed with the
lower court, Nurse failed to name the administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services as a party to the suit, nor did
Nurse serve a copy of the notice of appeal
upon the administrator. Nurse's amended
notice of appeal was also delinquent in the
above mentioned respects.
The attorney general moved to dismiss
the case on the grounds that the common
pleas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal since the administrator had not been named an appellee to
the suit and because no copy of the notice
of appeal had been served upon the administrator. The court denied the attorney
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general's motion, and, on January 22, 1980,
the court granted Nurse's motion to make
the administrator a party.
The common pleas court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review that Nurse
had been discharged for just cause. Nurse
appealed the lower court's affirmance of the
Board's decision. Through a cross assignment of error, the attorney general and
Firestone appealed the lower court's holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction.
Neither the attorney general nor Firestone
filed a notice of appeal with this court.
Assignments of Error
1. It was error for the court to affirm
the decision of the Board of Review since
there was no substantial, reliable and probative evidence to show that appellant
acted in willful disregard of her employer's best interest.
2. It was error, as a matter of law, for
the court to find that the discharge was
for just cause since, under the circumstances of this case, appellant was entitled to notice that any future infractions would subject her entire work
record to review for consideration on
whether to terminate her.
Our review of this appeal is very narrow
and limited solely to determine if the common pleas court acted properly in affirming
the Board of Review's decision. W e concur
in its finding that the Board of Review's
decision was lawful, reasonable and clearly
supported by virtually all of the evidence.
Its decision was completely supported by
substantial, probative and reliable evidence.
Appellant's argument that she was entitled
to a warning that future infractions would
result in a review of her whole record and
possibly invoke discharge are specious at
best Even under the appellant's definitions
of "just cause," we fail to see where "sleeping on the job, tardiness, absenteeism, fighting, negligence, and just plain 'poor work,' "
are in the employer's best interest or work
ing to the best of one's ability.
Preliminary Discussion of the
Assignment of Error
Nurse argues that:
This court is without jurisdiction to
consider the issue raised in appellant's
cross assignment of error since the appellee failed to file a proper, timely notice
of appeal.
R. C. 2505.22 provides:
Assignments of error may be filed on
behalf of an appellee which shall be passed
upon by a reviewing court before a judg-
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ment or order is reversed in whole or in
part. The time within which assignments
of error on behalf of an appellee may be
filed shall be fixed by rule of court.
In Parton v. Weilnau, 169 Ohio St. 145,
171 (1959), the Supreme Court, in construing R. C. 2505.22, held:
* * * that an assignment of error by
an appellee, where such appellee has not
filed any notice of appeal from the judgment of the lower court, may be used by
the appellee as a shield to protect the
judgment of the lower court but may not
be used by the appellee as a sword to
destroy or modify that judgment.
•

*

*

Since 'the attorney general and Firestone,
in the present case, seek to have the lower
court's judgment affirmed rather than modified or destroyed, this court will consider
the attorney general's and Firestone's cross
assignment of error
Additionally appellee argues that subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the lower court proceeding or the
appeal. We agree. Our Supreme Court in
Jenkins v. Keller, 6 Ohio St. 2d 122 (1966)
held that
Where a court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of an action or an
appeal, a challenge to jurisdiction on such
ground may effectively be made for the
first time on appeal in a reviewing court
We do not determine for purposes of this
appeal whether an actual notice of appeal
or cross-appeal was required by the appellees.
Appellee's Cross Assignment
of Error
The common pleas court erred in overruling the motions to dismiss submitted by
the office of the attorney general and by
the employer.
The Supreme Court and this court in
numerous decisions have held that R. C.
4141.28(0) and R. C. 4141.01(1) require
an appellant in an appeal of a decision of
the Board of Review to name the administration as an appellee in the suit and to
serve him with a copy of the notice of
appeal. In re Claim of King, 62 Ohio St.
2d 87 (1980); Sullivan v. Kaiser Engineers,
62 Ohio St. 2d 304 (1980); U. S. Steel v.
Board of Review, Lorain N o 2967 (9th Dist.
Ct. App., May 14, 1980); Joseph Bagdonas
v. Board of Review, Summit No. 9648 (9th
Dist. C t App., May 28, 1980). In re Claim
of: Vanessa T. Woolfork, Lorain No. 2996
(9th Dist. Ct. App., September 3, 1980).
Because Nurse did not comply with the
abovementioned requirements of R. C.
© 1981, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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capacity beyond March 1, 1980, until
subsequent to the date of her delivery
in May, 1980. As claimant was not physically able to work during the week ending March 29, 1980, the claim for said
week must be disallowed.
Ample evidence exists in the record to
support the finding that claimant made no
attempt to talk to someone in personnel
concerning work for her other than as a
flight attendant after December 2, 1979, and
the fact that claimant never attempted to
have her name removed from the medical
sick list nor to terminate the medical leave
of absence despite a second physician's

1149

6-17-83

more favorable report. Therefore, claimant
did not sustain her burden of proof as to
entitlement to benefits. This Court will not
disturb the administrative agency's fact and
credibility determinations.
Therefore, it is ordered that the decision
of the Board of Review to disallow any
further appeal is affirmed. The decision of
the Referee denying unemployment benefits to appellant was lawful, reasonable and
supported by the manifest weight of the
evidence pursuant to O. R. C Section
4141.28(0).
Appellant is to pay the costs of this appeal.

fl[ 9449] Willie L. Steagall v. Bd. of Rev. and Earle M. Jorgensen Co., Allan United
Steel Division, et aL Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County. No. A-8009521,
2/9/82.
Discharge for misconduct—Manner of performing work—Quality of work.—A
claimant was discharged for just cause where, in a two-year period, a total of 30 invoices
on which he had worked involved errors and required adjustments, where he had 13
counselling sessions with his employer, where he received a three-day disciplinary layoff
after which he committed errors on three more occasions, and where the claimant
admitted a number of errors in his work, including one mistake that cost his employer
$1,100. See Ohio tf 1970.55.
Claims and appeals procedure—Cross-examination.—Although the claimant was not
permitted to cross-examine his employer's witness, the hearing on his claim for benefits
was fair where the Referee did not formally invite cross-examination by the unrepresented
claimant, but where the Referee did question the employer's representative at the urging
of the claimant, and where, at the conclusion of the hearing, the claimant acknowledged
the hearing had "covered everything." See Ohio fl 2020.
Claims and appeals procedure—Evidence—Hearsay.—Although the claimant argued
that he had not received a fair hearing because the Referee had based his decision substantially on evidence that was hearsay on hearsay, the Referee may admit and accept
hearsay, and the employer's representative who testified had personal knowledge of the
events leading to discharge. The exhibits were prepared by the employer's representative
and the claimant acknowledged their authenticity, and another exhibit contained business
records, which are an exception to the hearsay rule. See Ohio fl 2020.23.
Simon, Anninos & Namanworth Co., L. P. A., Eli Namanworth, 408 Gwynne Bldg.,
602 Main St., Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for plaintiff-appellant. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister,
Lawrence C. Mackowiak, First National Bank Center, Fountain Square, Cincinnati, Ohio
45202, for defendant-appellee, Earle M. Jorgensen Co. Richard H. Lippert, Asst. Atty.
Gen., OBES, 1812 Central Parkway, Cincinnati, Ohio 45214.
GORMAN, J.: Plaintiff-Appellant, Willie L. defendant-appellee, Earle M. Jorgensen Co.
(Jorgensen). His duties were to cut steel
Steagall, has appealed from the decision of
the referee and the Board of Review, Ohio according to customer specifications. In
Bureau of Employment Services denying 1978 eight invoices and in 1979 twenty-two
his claim for unemployment compensation invoices upon which he worked involved
benefits. His appeal presents the following errors and required adjustments. He had
issues: (1) did plaintiff receive a fair hear- thirteen counselling sessions with his eming, and (2) was the decision against the ployer agreeing each time to improve his
manifest weight of the evidence? It was performance. On May 23, 1980 he received
submitted upon the certified record and the a three day disciplinary layoff because of
cutting errors. When he returned, he commemoranda of counsel.
mitted errors on three more occasions. On
Between March 6, 1978 and June 30, 1980 June 30, 1980 Jorgensen discharged plaintiff
plaintiff was employed as a "burner" by for careless and negligent work.
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Plaintiff argues he did not receive a fair
hearing because he was not permitted to
cross-examine defendant's witness and because the referee based his decision substantially on evidence that was hearsay on
hearsay. Under R. C. §4141.28(J) the referee in conducting the hearing is not bound
by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of
procedure, but he is to conduct the hearing
in such a way as to ascertain the facts and
to determine if a claimant is entitled to
benefits. The right to confront and to
cross-examine are fundamental to a fanhearing. After Sims, the employer's witness, testified, the referee did not formally
invite cross-examination by plaintiff who
was unrepresented by counsel. However,
the record conclusively reveals the referee
thoroughly questioned Sims at plaintiffs
urging (Tr. 27-30, 32-33, 35-40), and in fact,
when plaintiff was testifying did cross examine on plaintiffs behalf as illustrated by
the following example (Tr. 32):
Mr. Steagall: Ask him—ask: him how
much did they burn.
Referee: Well, how much did they burn,
Mr. Sims?
Mr. Sims: May I preference this a little
bit? etc. .
Furthermore, at the conclusion of the hearing plaintiff acknowledged the hearing
''covered everything," (Tr. 40).
Plaintiff also argues he was denied a fair
hearing because the employer's evidence
was totally hearsay on hearsay. The referee
may admit and accept hearsay. Simon v.
Lake Geauga Printing Co. (1982) 69 Ohio
St. 2d 41. This case does not present the

unfair situation where the testimony of the
employer's witness who is unacquainted
with the facts, is accepted as more credible
than the claimant's testimony. Gipson v.
Board of Review, 8 CCH UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE REPORTS, Ohio 1T 9356

(C.

P.

Hamilton Co. 1973). In this case not only
did the witness, Sims, have personal knowledge, repeated counselling for his alleged
substandard performance did occur. In addition, the employer's Exhibits 1 and 2 were
prepared by Sims and plaintiff acknowledged they were authentic (Tr. 18). Exhibit 2 appears to contain, what if qualified,
were business records, an exception to the
hearsay rule under Evid. R. 803(6), and
Exhibit 1 is nothing more than a documented narrative prepared by the witness.
No prejudicial or unfair advantage was
gained by the employer in their admission.
Although conflicting evidence appears in
the record, plaintiff admits a number of
errors in his work including one mistake
that cost Jorgensen $1,100 (Tr. 26). Plaintiff maintains Jorgensen terminated him
because of reduced work. However, there
is substantial evidence in the record in
which the referee could conclude plaintiff
was discharged for just cause and his decision and the decision of the Board of Review are not unlawful, unreasonable or
against the manifest weight of the evidence
as set forth in R. C §4141.28(0) and under
the authority of DeCaro v. Bd. of Rev., 8
CCH

UNEMPLOYMENT

INSURANCE

REPORTS,

Ohio 1F9356 (App. Cuyahoga 1981). Judgment affirmed.
Counsel will present an endorsed entry
reflecting the Court's decision by no later
than February 20, 1982.

[ff9450] Willie L. Steagall v. Bd. of Rev., Earle M. Jorgensen Co., and Allan United
Steel Division. Ohio Court of Appeals, First District, Hamilton County. No. C-820236,
12/29/82. Before KEEFE, P. J., and BLACK and DOAN, J J.

Discharge for misconduct—Manner of performing work—Quality of work.—A
claimant was discharged for just cause where he was responsible for more than 40
instances of careless work and had 13 personal counselling interviews with his superiors
directed at improving the erratic quality of his work. See Ohio fl 1970.55.
Claims and appeals procedure—Evidence—Hearsay.—Where a claimant asserted
that a hearing was unfair because he was not advised of the objectionable character of
the employer's hearsay evidence and that much of the evidence was double hearsay, the
assertions had no merit since formal rules of evidence do not apply in unemployment
compensation proceedings. The claim of prejudice by double hearsay was without foundation where facts testified to by the employer's representative that were beyond his
personal knowledge were in the nature of either business records or summaries of
records or were already properly before the Referee as statements previously made and
duly filed in the case. See Ohio f 2020.23.
The decision of the Court of Common Pleas at Ohio fl 9449 is affirmed
Unemployment Insurance Reports
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determination shall be made by the division within ninety [90] days after
the filing of such an application. Until a seasonal determination by the
division has been made in accordance with this section, no employer or
worker may be considered seasonal.
(c) Any interested party may file an appeal regarding a seasonal
determination within fifteen [15] calendar days after the determination by
the division and obtain review of the determination in accordance with IC
22-4-32.
(d) Whenever an employer is determined to be a seasonal employer, the
following provisions apply:
(1) The seasonal determination becomes effective the first day of the
calendar quarter commencing after the date of the seasonal determination.
(2) The seasonal determination does not affect any benefit rights of
seasonal workers with respect to employment before the effective date of
the seasonal determination.
(e) If a seasonal employer, after the date of its seasonal determination,
operates its business or its seasonal operation during a period or periods of
twenty-six [26] weeks or more in a calendar year, the employer shall be
determined by the division to have lost its seasonal status with respect to
that business or operation effective at the end of the then current calendar
quarter. The redetermination shall be reported in writing to the employer.
Any interested party may file an appeal within fifteen [15] calendar days
after the redetermination by the division and obtain review of the
redetermination in accordance with IC 22-4-32.
(f) Seasonal employers shall keep account of wages paid to seasonal
workers within the seasonal period as determined by the division, and shall
report these wages on a special seasonal quarterly report form provided by
the division.
(g) The division shall adopt rules applicable to seasonal employers for
determining their normal seasonal period or periods. [IC 22-4-14-11, as
added by P.L.228-1983, § 4.]
CHAPTER 15
DISQUALIFICATION FOR BENEFITS
SECTION.

SECTION.

22-4-15-1. Grounds for disqualification —
Exceptions.
22-4-15-2. Failure without good cause to
apply for or accept suitable work — Determination of suitable work.
22-4-15-3. Work stoppage because of labor
dispute — Individual not
participating — Separate
units of work — Exception.

22-4-15-4. Income

received from other
sources.
22-4-15-6. Discharge for gross misconduct
— "Gross misconduct" defined — Benefits held in
abeyance.
22-2-15-8. Benefits received from private
plans excepted.

22-4-15-1. Grounds for disqualification — Exceptions. — (a) With
Aspect to benefit periods, including extended benefit periods, established
on and after July 3, 1977, and before July 6, 1980, an individual who has
voluntarily left his employment without good cause in connection with the
w
ork or who was discharged from his employment for just cause is
ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights for the week in which the
disqualifying separation occurred and until he has subsequently earned
remuneration in employment equal to or exceeding eight [8] times the
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Simon, Anninos & Namanworth Co., L. P. A., Eli Namanworth, 408 Gwynne Bldg.,
602 Main St., Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for plaintiff-appellant. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister,
Lawrence C. Mackowiak, First National Bank Center, Fountain Square, Cincinnati, Ohio
45202, for defendant-appellee, Earle M. Jorgensen Co.
PER CURIAM: This cause came on to be
heard upon the appeal, the transcript of
the docket, journal entries and original
papers, including the transcript of the administrative proceedings, from the Court of
Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio, the
briefs and the arguments of counsel.
Appellant seeks unemployment compensation after termination from his job as a
"burner" (cutter of steel plates) at Earle
M. Jorgensen Company (employer). His
claim was denied at all administrative levels,
and these decisions were affirmed by the
court of common pleas. In two assignments
of error, appellant asserts that he was
denied a fair hearing before the administrative referee and that the administrative
denial of benefits was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of
the evidence. We are not persuaded.
The employer is a metal service center
that purchases steel from suppliers and
processes it to the exact specifications of
its customers. Appellant worked as a
"burner" for two years and three months,
and he was discharged for carelessness. At
the referee's hearing under R. C. 4141.28(J)
no attorneys were present, appellant representing himself and the assistant general
manager representing the employer.
Appellant's first assignment of error asserts the hearing was unfair, because he was
not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine, he was not advised of the objectionable character of the employer's hearsay
evidence, and much of this evidence was
hearsay on hearsay. The statute, however,
does not require the strict formality of the
rules of procedure and of evidence applicable to judicial hearings. The parties must
be afforded "reasonable opportunity for a
fair hearing," under R. C 4141.28(1), which
goes on to provide:
In the conduct of such hearing or any
other hearing on appeal to the board
which is provided in this section, the
board and the referees shall not be bound
by common law or statutory rules of
evidence or by technical or formal rules
of procedure. The board and the referees
shall take any steps in such hearings,
consistent with the impartial discharge of
their duties, which appear reasonable and
necessary to ascertain the facts and determine whether the claimant is entitled
to benefits under the law.
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We agree with the common pleas court
that the hearing sub judice met the statutory
standard of fairness. The conduct of the
hearing was informal and did not follow
the rigorous order of a judicial hearing,
but appellant was afforded every reasonable opportunity to question the employer's
assertions of carelessness and damage.
There was no need to advise appellant that
the employer's evidence was objectionable
as hearsay, because the rules of evidence
do not apply. In addition, much of the
damaging evidence against appellant was
either admitted by him or within the personal knowledge of the employer's representative. The claim of prejudice by reason
of the receipt of double hearsay is without
foundation, because those facts testified to
by the employer's representative that were
beyond his personal knowledge were properly considered by the referee as being in
the nature of either business records or
summaries of voluminous records, or they
were already properly before the referee as
statements previously made and duly filed
in the case. R. C. 4141.28(J). The first assignment of error has no merit.
Appellant's second assignment asserts
that the common pleas court erred in affirming the administrative decision because
that decision was unlawful, unreasonable
and against the manifest weight of the
evidence R. G 4141.28(0). Our review
of the record discloses no breach of law
at the administrative level. The transcript
of the administrative procedures discloses
that during the period of employment, appellant was responsible for more than forty
instances of careless work and had thirteen
personal counseling interviews with his superiors directed at improving the erratic •
quality of his work. The decision that1
appellant was discharged for just cause isboth reasonable and supported by the evidence presented to the referee. A reviewing
court cannot impose a higher standard of
proof than what the statute requires in tn"e
administrative proceedings. Simon v. Lake
Geauga Printing Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.
2d 41, 430 N. E. 2d 468. The second assignment is meritless.
We affirm.
KEEFE, P, ] , 111 M"K and FNIAII
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19 § 33^5

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

Claimant for unemployment compensation
benefits must do more than be passively
available and waiting for work Lore v.

19 § 3315

Lnemployment Comp. Comm'n, Del. Super., 86
A.2d 856 (1952).

§ 3315. Disqualification for benefits.
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
"" (1) For the period of unemployment next ensuing after he has left his
work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work. However,
if an individual has left his work involuntarily because of illness, no
disqualification shall prevail after he becomes able to work and available for
work and meets all other requirements under this title, but the Department
shall require a doctor's certificate to establish such availability. Wage
credits earned in such work, if employment under this title, shall not
constitute benefit wages in connection with §§ 3349-3356 of this title.
(2) For the period of unemployment next ensuing after an individual has
been discharged from his work for just cause in connection with his work.
Wage credits earned in such work, if employment under this title, shall not
constitute benefit wages in connection with §§ 3349-3356 of this title.
(3) If he has refused to accept an offer of work for which he is reasonably
fitted or has refused to accept a referral to a job opportunity when directed
to do so by a local employment office of this State or another state, and the
disqualification shall begin with the week in which the refusal occurred and
shall continue for the duration of the period of unemployment during which
such refusal occurred; provided that no individual shall be disqualified under
this subdivision for refusing to accept an offer of work or a referral while
he is attending a vocational training course approved by the Department if
the acceptance~of such offer or referral would prevent him from completing
the course. No individual otherwise qualified to receive benefits shall lose
the right to benefits by reason of a refusal to accept a referral or new work
if:
a. As a condition of being so employed, he would be required by the
employer to join a company union or would be required by the employer
to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization
or would be denied the right by the employer to retain membership in
and observe the lawful rules of any such organization; or
b. The position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout or
other labor dispute; or
c. The work is at an unreasonable distance from his residence, having
regard to the character of the work he has been accustomed to do, and
travel to the place of work involves expenses substantially greater than
that required for his former work; or
d. The remuneration, hours or other conditions of the work offered
are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing
for similar work in the locality;
(4) For any week with respect to which the Department finds that his
total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other premises
at which he is or was last employed;
191

22-4-1 5 1

LABOR—KMPI^>VMi^T 'SECURITY

weekly benefit amount of Ms claim. If the qualification amount has not
been earned at the expiration of an individual's benefit period, the
unearned amount shall he carried forward to an extended benefit period or
to the benefit period of a subsequent claim,
Ob) With respect to bepefit periodst established on and after July 6,1980,
an individual who has voluntarily l^ft his employment without good cause
in connection with the work or ^yho was discharged from his employment
for just cause is ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights for the week
in which the disqualifying separation occurred and until he has earned
remuneration in employment equal to or exceeding the weekly benefit
amount of his claim m each of eight [81 weeks. If thq qualification amount
has not been earned at the expiration of an individual s benefit period, the
unearned amount shall be earned for ward to* an extended benefit period or
to the benefit period of a subsequentidaim.
(c) When it has been determined that an individual has been separated
from employment under disqualifying conditions as outlined in this section,
the maximum benefit amount irfhia current claim, as initially determined,
shall be reduced by twenty-five percent [25%]. If twenty-five percent [25%]
of the maximum benefit amount is not an even dollar amount, the amount
of such reduction will be Raised to the next higher even dollar amount.
When twenty-five pehsent;T2S%r1tf the maximum benefit amount, as
initially determined, exceeds the unpaid balance remaining in the claim,
such reduction will be limited**the \mpaid balance.
(d) The dis<|uaUficationspiwndedl»tWs section shall be subject to the
following modifications:
(1) An individual shall not be sutyect to disqualification because of
separation from his prior employment if he left to accept with another
employer previously secured permanent full-time work which offered
reasonable expectation of betterment of wages or working conditions and
thereafter was employed oh said iob for not less than ten [10] weeks or if,
having been simultaneously employed by two [2] employers, he leaves one
[1] such employer volimtaariiy^ttiout good cause in connection with the
work but remains in employment with the second employer for at least ten
[10] weeks subsequent to leaving the first employer, or if he left to accept
recall made by a base-period employer.
(2) An individual whose unemployment is the result of medically
substantiated physical disability and who is involuntarily unemployed
after having made reasonable efforts to maintain the employment relationship shall not be subject to disqualification under this section for such
separation.
(3) An individual who left work to enter the Armed Forces of the United
States shall not be subject to disqualification under this section for such
leaving of work.
(4) An individual whose employment is terminated under the compulsory retirement prevision of a collective bargaining agreement to which the
employer is a party, or under any other plan, system, or program, public or
private, provioing for compulsory retirement and who is otherwise eligible
shall not be deemed to have left his work voluntarily without good cause in
connection with the work; however, if such individual subsequently
becomes reemployed and thereafter yqd^ntarily leaves work without good
cause in connection with the work, he shall he deemed ineligible as
outlined in this section.
(5) An otherwise eligible individual shall not be denied benefits for any
week because he is in training approved under Section 236(a)(1) [19 U.S.C.
§ 2296(a)(1)] of the Tfade Aw of 1974,ttordhall the individual be denied
benefits by reason of leaving work to enter such training, provided the
work left is not suitable employment, offcecause of the application to any
week in training of provkmi* m this* law (or any applicable federal

149

DISQUALIFICATION FOR BENEFITS

22-4-15*1

unemployment compensation law), relating to availability for work, active
search for work, or refusal to accept work. For purposes of this subdivision,
the term "suitable employment" moans with respect to an individual, work
of a substantially equal cor higher skill level than the individual's past
adversely affected employment (ias defined for purposes of the Trade Act of
1974), and. wages for such work at not less than eighty percent [80%] of the
individual's average* weekly wage as determined for the purposes of the
Trade Act of 1974T ;'
(e) "Discharge for just cauae" as used in this section is defined to include
but not be limited to; ^ ; ^
(1) Separation initiated by an employer for falsification of an employment application ta obtain employment through subterfuge;
(2) l o w i n g violation of It reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an
employer;
(3) Unsatisfactwy attendance, if the individual cannot show good cause
for absences or tardiness;
(4) Damaging the? employwr'a property through wilful negligence;
(5) RefusinytoobeyiiurtTUctions;
(6) Reporting to work under the influence of alcohol or drugs or
consuming alcohol or drugs on employer's premises during working hours;
(7) Conduct endangering safety of self or coworkers; or
(8) Incarceration in jail following conviction of a misdemeanor or felony
by a court of competent jurisdiction or for any breach of duty in connection
with work which is reasonably owed an employer by an employee. [Acts
1947, eh. 208, § -Uktti'B. W8; 1957, ch. 261, § 1; 1965, ch. 190, § 9; 1967,
ch. 310, § 19; m i , B I * 36&i 35; 1972, P.L. 174, § 1; 1974, P.L. 110, § 4;
1977, Pi* 262, r ^ l « a 0 i PX. 158, § 5; 1982, P.L. 95, § 4*1
Adnic Cod** M* pertinent administrative rales ana refulafions, see the
Statutory Tables in toe tables volume of the
Indiana Administrative Code.
Indiana Law Review. Survey of Recent
Developments in Indiana Law, XL Labor
Law (Gregory J. UtktraX 11 Ind. L Rev. 196.
Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana
Law, XL Labor Law (Richard J. Darko), 13
Ind. L. Rev. 295.
Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana
Law, V. Constitutional Law (Stephen E.
Arthur and Christopher DrSeigel), 14 Ind. L.
Bap* 196.

Cited: Bendix Corp. v. Radecki (1973), 158
Ind. App. 370,39 Ind. Dec. 376,302 N. E. (2d)
847; Walker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp.
Security Div., — Ind. App. —, 76 Ind. Dec.
356, 404 N.E.24 1363 (1980); Russell v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Security Div., — Ind.
App. ~ , 415 N.E.2d 774 (1981); Forster v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Security Div., — Ind.
App. —, 420 N.E.2d 1287 (1981); Pierce
Governor Co. v. Review Bd., — Ind. App. —,
426 N.E.2d 700 (1981); Flick v. Review Bd.,
— Ind. App.—, 443 N.E.2d 84 (1982).
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The Departments decision dated February 20, 1985, denied unemployment insurance
benefits effective January 27, 1985, on the grounds the claimant was discharged
for just cause. Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act is
quoted on the attached sheet.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Prior to f i l i n g a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective January 27,
1985, the claimant earned $10.35 per hour working as a boiler operator for Logan
Regional Hospital from September 10, 1980, to January 31, 1985. His weekly bene" t amount is $186 for twenty-six weeks.
The claimant was discharged for failing _ jperate hospital equipment according
to polic)
He discovered a leaky water pressure valve and he determined the
valve had to be repaired immediately. The system had a by-pass valve to permit
the water to continue to flow, but the valve required manual regulation of the
pressure. The claimant activated the valve, and he asked one of his co-workers
to assist him in watching the pressure valve. When the by-pass valve was turned
on, the water pressure was too great and i t caused minor flooding on the upper
floors of the building. The claimant reduced the pressure and, at a point, the
pressure was too low causing employees to complain about no water. The claimant
thought he had the valve adjusted correctly and he repaired the faulty part.
Ihe claimant's supervisor later learned that there had been a shut-down of the
water system and he terminated the claimant. The claimant was aware of the
proper procedures to operate the water system and he believed he had performed
the task correctly. He stated the water never stopped flowing through the system.
There had been three prior occasions when the claimant had been involved in
equipment shutdowns. He had received two disciplinary counseling actions and a
reprimand for the incidents.
REASONING AND CONCLUSION C I I 1he disqualification providec
shows the discharge was due

' '
Section 5(b)(1) does not apply where evidence
^ ^ c i e n c y , unsatisfactory conduct, failure in
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good performance as the result of Inability or Incapability, inadvertencies or
ordinary negligence in Isolated instaj^AS^ or good faith errors in judgement.
A denial of unemployment Insurance benefits following a discharge is based on a
fault concept, as explained in the following decision:
When an employee 1s discharged by his employer, such discharge may have been the result of incompetence, lack of
s k i l l , or other reasons which are clearly beyond the
claimant's control. The fact of willful or wanton conduct
is not established merely by the claimant's knowledge that
he is violating a reasonable rule of the employer; rather,
i t must be shown from the evidence that the claimant knew
or had reason to know that his conduct may result in loss
of employment. (Utah Board of Review, 80-BR-322.)
In the present case, the claimant testified credibly he believed he had handled
the procedures to switch the water to the by-pass system in order to repair the
pressure valve correctly. I t was unclear how long any unit of the hospital may
have been without water or had the water supply curtailed, but the evidence
established the claimant had made a valid effort to keep the system operating
effectively. Even though he may have been previously involved in incidents d e t r i mental to the hospital's equipment, the testimony did not establish culpable
negligence or a disregard for the employer's interest in his actions. I t is held
the circumstances were the result of inadvertent conditions beyond the claimant's
power to control and i t is concluded he was not discharged for just cause in
accordance with the Utah Employment Security Act.
DECISION:
The decision of the Department representative is reversed and benefits are allowed
effective January 27, 1985, pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

This decision will become final unless within ten days from March 26, 1985,
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 11600, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal is made.
jsn
Attachment
cc:

Logan Regional Hospital
1400 North 500 East
Logan, Utah 84321
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BOARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Unemployment Compensation Appeals
ABDUL H. DAILAMI
S.S.A. No. 529 29 0539
vs.

*RTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

:
:

Case No. 85-A-1283

:

DECISION

:

Case No. 85-BR-210

:

After careful consideration of the record and testimony
the
above-entitled matter, the Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be fair and unbiased and supported by competent
evidence and, therefore, affirms such decision allowing benefits to the
claimant effective January 27, 1985, and continuing, provided he is otherwise eligible, on the grounds he was discharged from his employment for
conduct which is not disqualifying under the provisions of §35-4-5(b)(l) of
the Utah Employment Security Act. In so holding, the Board of Review hereby
adopts the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge.
In affirming the decision _* the Administrative Law Judge, the
Board of Review notes the employer's argument that the Administrative Law
Judge applied an erroneous standard to the case. Specifically, it is the
employer s contention that the quotation by the Administrative Law Judge of
a 1980 decision evidences an application of the willful or wanton conduct
standard, whereas the Legislature 1n 1983 added a "just cause" standard.
However, a review of the decision of the Administrative Law Judge shows that
his purpose in quoting a portion of a 1980 Board of Review decision was simply
to explain that there must be a showing from the evidence that the claimant
knew or had reason to know his conduct might result 1n loss of employment.
This standard relates to the fault concept applicable to disqualifications
from receipt of unemployment benefits. The Utah Supreme Court has very
recently stated that "[N]ot every cause for discharge provides a basis
to deny eligibility for unemployment compensation." Board of Education of
Sevier County School District v. Board of Review, 11 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17
11983), Case No. 19/bO, quoting Clearfield city v. Department of Employment
Security, Utah, 663 P.2d 440, 441 (1983).
In the case of Kehl v. Board of Review, 10 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (1985),
Case No. 20193, cited by the employer 1n its brief to the Board, the Utah
Supreme Court reviewed the case law of Delaware, Ohio, and Indiana in its
consideration of the meaning of the term "just cause." The court then
reviewed the Department's proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(II)-l in light of the
meaning given "just cause" in other jurisdictions and concluded that the

\
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BOARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Unemployment Compensation Appeals
ABDUL H. DAILAMI
S.S.A. No. 529 29 0539

:

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

:

Case No. 85-A-1283

:

DECISION

:

Case No. 85-BR-210

:
- Page 2 -

proposed Rules and Regulations are within the limits of reasonableness and
rationality. I t should be noted that the proposed rule 1s not binding at
this point 1n time, as 1t has not become final. However, 1t provides guidance
1n an area that Is new to this jurisdiction, that 1s, the meaning of the term
"just cause."
The proposed rule provides that the basic factors for establishing
fault are culpability, knowledge, and control. In reviewing the negligence
complained of by the employer In the instant case against those factors, the
Board of Review finds that the claimant's failure to control the water pressure in the building with a bypass valve while trying to repair the regular
valve was beyond the claimant s control. I t was this Incident which led to
the claimant's discharge. All of the prior incidences of which the employer
complains occurred in 1983, with the exception of one which occurred in September of 1984. While the Incidences which occurred in 1983 may been within
the claimant's control, the employer chose not to discharge the claimant at
that time. The employer also complains that the claimant failed to repair a
malfunctioning water heater for a period of two years. The question must be
asked why the employer allowed the claimant to take two years to effect the
necessary repairs to the water heater.
Although the employer has provided evidence of Incidences where the
claimant failed to properly perform his duties, the record is devoid of any
evidence to show that the claimant acted with culpability. The term culpability has previously been defined by the Supreme Court as referring to how
serious the claimant's conduct affects his job or the employer's rightful
interests. See Clearfield City v. Board of Review, supra.
Based on the evidence of record in this case, the Board of Review
concludes that the employer has failed to show that the claimant's performance
was the result of anything other than inability, incapacity or isolated
instances of inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in Isolated instances.
Under such circumstances, the allowance of benefits must be affirmed.
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BOARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Unemployment Compensation Appeals
ABDUL H. DAILAMI
S.S.A. No. 529 29 0539
Case No. 85-A-1283
DECISION

vs.

Case No. 85-BR-210
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
- Page 3 This decision will become final ten days after the date of mailing
hereof, and any further appeal must be made directly with the Utah Supreme
Court at the State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, within ten days
after this decision becomes final. To file an appeal with the Supreme Court,
you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ of Review
setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35-4-10(1) of the Utah
Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief.
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Dated this 18th day of June, 1985.
Date Mailed: June 21, 1985.
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